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ANSWERING ANOTHER ‘IRISH QUESTION’: BREXIT AND THE IRISH BORDER 
 
Gladstone .. spent his declining years trying to guess the answer to the Irish Question; unfortunately, 
whenever he was getting warm, the Irish secretly changed the Question  
  
             W.C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman 1066 and All That: A Memorable History of England (1930) 
   
                           PART ONE:IRELAND’S SLOW ROAD TO PEACE   
          And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow William Butler Yeats (1888) 
 
 
 
CONTEXT: THE BORDER AND BREXIT  
The outcome of the 2016 British referendum on EU membership will have significant and 
lasting consequences. For the United Kingdom and its relations with European neighbours, 
for the constitutional fabric of the British State and for the EU at a time of uncertainty over 
the future of the European project. The consequences of this decision will have no greater 
impact however than on the still-fragile peace process known as the ‘Good Friday’ or Belfast 
Agreement, negotiated in 1998 by parties representing Northern Ireland’s principal cultural 
communities and the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This 
historic event brought to an end decades of political violence and centuries of sectarian 
bitterness, or so it was thought at the time. Brexit has thrown into doubt the future of that 
peace process.  
 
The EU was an important guarantor of that historic reconciliation, and an exemplar too of 
peaceful coexistence and ‘ever-closer’ integration within a framework of multi-level 
governance. The European project pursued a functional approach to rebuilding trust between 
former enemies, by pooling or sharing key elements of national sovereignty, most especially 
in economic and functional matters. A méthode communautaire as the paradigm for what 
might be achieved by setting aside ancient quarrels, co-operating to recover political trust and 
improve economic prosperity in a Continent ravaged by war and chaos. A model for repairing 
fractured politics, as it has proved to be in Ireland. The European Union was essential agency 
for inter-communal reconciliation in Ireland and it has continued to play its part, both in 
facilitating and funding projects that have contributed to consolidating the peace process. 
Projects that have restored public confidence in ‘normal’ politics, reinstating trust in 
government, and in the process lessening the appeal of violence as the first reflex of politics. 
Amongst these important achievements was the shift in the very meaning and symbolism of 
the 1921 border, from outright barrier to conduit between Northern Ireland and the Republic.  
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The British Government’s decision to heed the narrow decision in the 2016 referendum and 
withdraw from the EU, leave the customs union and the Single Market, has thrown into doubt 
this return to normalcy. The decision to recover what Brexit voters are persuaded is their 
sovereign right to ‘take back control’ of trade policy from Brussels, and with that to end free 
movement of people and to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, 
will have serious consequences both for the operational management and politics of the UK-
EU border. Nowhere more so than in Ireland, where what over-time has become an invisible 
and mostly insignificant border will recover some of the paraphernalia and connotations of an 
international border. And with that renewed uncertainty about co-operation between 
communities on the ground and political authorities in the region, potentially even reversing 
the peace process.  
 
Nothing is certain in politics whose most consistent law is that of (mostly) unanticipated 
consequences. The objective of this short series of position papers is to review the likely 
consequences of this mostly unexpected threat to peace in this famously turbulent region. To 
reflect on inimical consequences that might ensue from the border issue and how these might 
be averted by reviewing various proposals for border management, and especially those 
proposed by the British Government whose decision to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty and serve notice of withdrawal from the EU has brought renewed anxiety to this 
region. Indeed, what is at stake here is nothing less dramatic than the prospect of turning back 
the clock, with the peace process as Brexit’s most calamitous casualty.   
 
ORIGINS OF AN ANCIENT QUARREL 
What the nineteenth century British prime minister, William Gladstone famously described as 
‘the Irish Question’ has been a persistent theme in British politics throughout the past two 
centuries, although the principal logics of ‘the question’ have shifted in response to changing 
political circumstances. Anglo-Irish relations have many dimensions, cultural, political, 
strategic and economic, yet the essence of what are mostly problematic relations is politics: 
the island of Ireland’s constitutional status and political relations with its more powerful 
British neighbour. Home Rule finally granted to the 26 southern counties in the 1921 Anglo-
Irish Treaty represented an historic shift in relations, consigning the ‘ancient quarrel’ between 
the former imperial power and what Irish nationalists regarded as ‘occupied’ territory to 
history, at least for the two principals. The successor Irish Free State’s relations with the 
former British imperium were always problematic, a mostly one-sided bargain: accorded 
semi-independent status under the terms of the 1921 Treaty, but at London’s insistence 
remaining as a Dominion of the British Empire. With the ratification of the 1937 
Constitution, Ireland’s Parliament (Oireachtas) confirmed the Free State’s unilateral 
repudiation of the 1931 Statute of Westminster that had defined relations between the British 
Crown and Commonwealth Dominions, assuming the status of a Republic outside the British 
Empire. A status finally confirmed by the Republic of Ireland Act (1948) and to all intents an 
ancient quarrel finally resolved, or so it seemed. 
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British assumptions about finality underestimated the corrosive impact of festering 
resentments amongst the minority community in Northern Ireland. A sense of grievance 
amongst Ulster’s Catholics that the right to sovereign independence conferred on the Free 
State was denied to them. Nationalists on both sides of the 1921 border repudiated partition 
as much less the outcome of equitable negotiation than fait accompli. A conditional Home 
Rule imposed on the 26 southern counties, with a Northern Province carved out of the island, 
where power resided with a unionist majority retaining allegiance to the Crown. The 1937 
Irish Constitution did not recognise the legality of the border, Article 2 proclaiming ‘legal 
right’ to the six northern counties, affirming that: “The national territory consists of the whole 
island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas”. The fact that the boundary between these 
quite separate international jurisdictions was seen by Republicans as an imposed frontier, 
with Irish citizens marooned on one side of it, ensured that the optimistic expectation the 
‘Irish Question’ was finally answered turned out to be merely wishful thinking.  
 
HISTORIC LEGACIES, LINGERING RESENTMENT 
Residual resentment characterized Irish politics on both sides of the border for decades to 
come: a cultural-religious fault-line within Northern Ireland, and one that demarcated party 
politics in the new Irish state. This legacy of resentment faded over time in the Republic, or 
rather became discounted by generational change, overtaken by the onset of modernity that in 
time gave rise to altogether new social priorities that altered the dynamics of Irish politics. 
The de facto 1921 border however politically inconvenient to nationalists could not be 
ignored and its existence was acknowledged de jure in the 1937 Constitution, whose Article 3 
affirmed the objective of “reintegration of the national territory”. The legal status of the 
border notwithstanding, its cultural significance continued to frame relations on the island 
and fractured civil society in the Northern Province. At the same time, Anglo-Irish relations 
on both the political / legal and socio-cultural levels have remained ambiguous. This much 
was apparent from the start, constitutional formality complemented by legal and political 
agreements between London and Dublin that confirmed close albeit nuanced relations. A case 
in point here is the Common Travel Area that has existed in some degree or other since 
Ireland regained its independence. An area of open borders that comprises the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and the other British 
islands, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. 
Meanwhile, resentment in the minority nationalist community over partition per se and what 
was seen as denial of civil rights acquired political momentum a consequence of historical 
memory but fortified by blatant abuse of public power by the unionist majority. 
Discrimination was customary practice throughout the public domain, in everything from 
access to public goods to sharing political power: in social housing, public sector 
employment and justice, the magistracy and police service recruited predominantly from, 
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managed on behalf of the majority community.1  The Province was governed mainly in the 
interests of the unionist majority whose representatives in the regional parliament at Stormont 
and in the tertiary authorities controlled the levers of public power and disbursed the ‘spoils’ 
of office largely on a sectarian basis. Even the constitutional fabric was debased with 
constituency boundaries drawn or ‘gerrymandered’ in order to minimize the return of 
nationalists to local government and parliamentary seats. A polity whose constitutional status 
as a constituent of the ‘union state’ of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland state was underpinned by cultural ascendancy and whose practice and consequences 
were condoned by successive British governments. A situation that also confirmed an abiding 
sense of alienation in the minority nationalist community, that saw itself as forcibly separated 
from compatriots in the Republic, abandoned if reluctantly by the Dublin politicians and 
victimized in their everyday affairs and life chances..  
What for centuries had been classic imperial relations between neighbouring British islands, 
translated after 1921 into a quarrel defined by ethno-cultural domination in the newly created 
Province of Northern Ireland. A Protestant and unionist majority wielding public power 
almost exclusively and in their own communal interest, ruling over a Catholic nationalist 
minority mostly excluded from political influence.2 Rather than answering the longstanding 
‘Irish Question’, partition merely translated it as fierce ethno-cultural rivalry within the new 
micro-polity, reinforcing a culturally defined fault line and cultural separatism, within 
Northern Ireland as much as between the two political jurisdictions on the island of Ireland. 
On one side, unionists ‘loyal’ to the British State, and on the other nationalists and 
Republicans who saw themselves as victims of rank discrimination, now marooned in an 
alien polity, indeed in a foreign country.3  
Resentment amongst the minority community gave rise to an embittered politics, and not only 
on the nationalist side of this religio-cultural divide.4 Protestants too were mistrustful, and not 
only of nationalist opponents. Their political leaders remained alert to possible betrayal by 
Westminster parties, and the more so as these parties over time disengaged emotionally and 
politically from the loyalist cause, seemingly indifferent to and prospectively prepared as 
unionists saw it to ‘betray’ their claims to be exclusively British. Consequently, unionists 
have felt themselves to be hostage to potential ‘treachery’ by any future British Government 
receptive to fashionable ideas about Irish reunification. Whether in response to changing 
ideas about ‘Britishness’ and the British State, or encouraged by ‘integrationists’ in Brussels 
after both countries had joined the European Community. The outcome in both Northern 
communities was embittered politics, visceral resentment and for some cultural antagonism 
                                                          
1 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, Northern Ireland since 1920, in Richard Bourke and Ian McBride (eds),The Princeton 
History of Modern Ireland. (Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 141-67. 
2 Cillian McGrattan, Northern Ireland 1968-2008: The Politics of Entrenchment (Macmillan Palgrave, 
Basingstoke 2010). 
3 Ian McBride, Introduction: Memory and National Identity in Modern Ireland, in Ian McBride (ed), History and 
Memory in Modern Ireland ( Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.1-42.  
4 Peter Burke, What Is Cultural History? (Polity Press, 2nd edition Cambridge, 2010)  
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that translated as outright hatred. A malignant politics expressed as unremitting sectarianism 
and intermittently as political mayhem and even violence by militants on both sides.5 
 
FROM ‘THE TROUBLES’ TO THE PEACE PROCESS 
Resentment is no reliable foundation for stable politics or constructive engagement, and so it 
has proved in Northern Ireland. Frustration over civil rights abuse and lack of equal 
opportunities amongst the minority community eventually gave rise to a civil rights 
movement committed at the outset to peaceful pursuit of equal rights. Marches and public 
demonstrations that incited outrage from loyalists and as the political situation deteriorated 
gave rise to paramilitary organizations on both sides intent on escalating violence. The British 
army was deployed to keep the peace and in March 1972, London suspended the regional 
parliament and imposed direct rule.6 What followed was three decades of mayhem known 
locally as ‘The Troubles’, spilling over the border with the Republic and occasionally across 
to the mainland with terrorist atrocities perpetrated by factions of the IRA, prompting in turn 
countervailing violence from hardline loyalist militias.7 The presence of the British army 
merely increased insurgency, with bombs and bullets rather than the ballot box as the 
principal medium of politics.8  
After thirty years of disorder, tentative moves for peaceful resolution by the principal 
territorial governments with encouragement from Washington and Brussels brought ceasefire 
followed by negotiations. The outcome was the historic peace process that established power-
sharing institutions, and just as important acceptance all-round of the principle of ‘parity of 
esteem’ between the majority unionist and minority nationalist communities. The 
paramilitaries agreed to decommission their arms caches and abandon armed struggle for 
normal politics, and although by no means entirely reconciling their abiding political 
differences, committed to a peace process based on power sharing.9  An Irish solution, yet 
one that would not have been realized without active involvement from external actors.  
The principals in these negotiations were not only the representatives of the embattled 
communities, nor even governments in London and Dublin. No less significant as external 
guarantors and facilitators of the peace process on the ground were American President, Bill 
Clinton and the European Union. Common experience of EU Membership by the two states 
                                                          
5 Brian Barton, Northern Ireland, 1920-25, in J. R. Hill (ed), Ireland, 1921-84. Vol. 7 of A New History of 
Ireland, edited by F. J. Byrne, W. E. Vaughan, Art Cosgrove, J. R. Hill and Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), at pp.161-198. 
6 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland 
Conflict (3rd edition Viking Press, London, 2012). 
7 Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (2nd edition, Athlone Press, 
1996) 
8 Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, Conflict to peace: Politics and society in Northern Ireland over half a 
century (Manchester University Press, 2013). 
9 Cecelia Clegg, Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, in Sebastian 
C. H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity. 
(Ashgate, Abingdon 2008), pp.81-93. 
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and no less important local government and other agencies on both sides was instrumental, 
both for making political connections and for ensuring collaboration between the respective 
communities on the ground that replaced outright hostility with grudging acceptance of a 
shared interest in peace. After British and Irish accession to the EEC in 1973 goods, services 
and people transited the border in both directions and in increasing volume, with cross-border 
collaboration on a range of social, economic and infrastructural projects.10 Activity at every 
level and much of it financed by generous EC / EU structural funds was a major incentive to 
embedding the peace process where it most mattered, on the ground in long-separated 
communities and as such facilitating unprecedented co-operation between the cultural tribes 
and both Irelands.11  
The post-1921 border had been a cultural impediment as much as a political barrier and 
international frontier demarcating distinct political and legal entities. A manned and 
militarized symbol of an ancient quarrel, demarcated by barbed wire, armed watch towers, 
and documentary checks regardless of the right to free movement and transit, and continuing 
to be so even after mutual EC accession in 1973.12  The launch of the Single Market in 1993 
ensured altogether closer collaboration and further reduced the significance – indeed the 
relevance - of the border, although without eliminating it altogether. The peace process was 
nevertheless a signal moment, finally converting a ‘hard’ border into a merely vestigial, 
almost invisible boundary: much less a barrier than a bridge and a conduit for exponentially 
increasing cross-border co-operation within the broader compass of European integration.  
The Belfast Agreement marks the historic step change towards peace and even reconciliation, 
although by no means ending this ancient quarrel. Over time, the formal geographic border 
became both invisible and redundant, until the EU referendum vote in June 2016. Brexit has 
cast a long shadow over this ‘slow dropping peace’, as it has over future EU / United 
Kingdom relations, after 1973 seemingly on the mend after decades in the doldrums. None of 
the collateral damage caused by Brexit has greater significance for regional relations than 
renewed uncertainty about the future meaning and status of the Irish border, reviving 
anxieties and jeopardizing what is a still fragile peace in this factious region. 
The mostly unforeseen consequences of the ‘Brexit’ referendum have challenged some 
supposedly settled assumptions about British politics: London’s relations with erstwhile EU 
partners certainly, but even more serious the survival of the peace process itself. Brexit has 
brought to the fore the prospect of a border no longer politically settled or physically 
innocuous. This in turn raises serious challenges to settled politics and on several levels: to 
the United Kingdom’s continuing commitment to the peace process; provocation to the 
                                                          
10 E. Meehan, Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question?: British-Irish relations in the context of the 
European Union and the Belfast Agreement’, Review of International Studies, 26 (1) 2000, pp. 83-97. 
11 John Doyle, Governance and Citizenship in contested states: the Northern Ireland peace agreement as 
internationalised governance, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 10 1999, pp.201-219, available online at 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11308392.pdf. 
12 Brian Barton, Northern Ireland, 1920-25, in J. R. Hill (ed), Ireland, 1921-84. Vol. 7 of A New History of 
Ireland, edited by F. J. Byrne, W. E. Vaughan, Art Cosgrove, J. R. Hill and Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), at pp.161-198. 
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special status and propinquity of Anglo-Irish relations; and no less critical, challenge to the 
United Kingdom’s relations with soon to be former EU partners. More ominously, Brexit 
threatens fragile communal relations in Northern Ireland, portending a breakdown in trust and 
peaceful co-operation that has been the signal achievement of the peace process since 1998. 
 
CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS BEFORE THE BELFAST ACCORD 
In the decades up to the Belfast Agreement Ireland was beset with economic fragmentation as 
between north and south.13 Before the launch of the Single Market, delays at designated 
crossing points for customs and security checks and rudimentary transport links all 
contributed to lagging co-operation and deficient communications.14 Official statistics 
confirm the absence of integration, even between neighbouring jurisdictions that each 
belonged to the Common Market. At the time of the SEM’s launch cross-border trade of 
some IR£1.127 million per annum was no more than modest, both ‘Irelands’ trading more 
intensively with the United Kingdom than with one another. Thereafter an emergent 
transnational political economy had a positive impact on economic and functional integration, 
boosting business and trade and with favourable political consequences, not least in the 
border region.15   
Accelerating European integration was instrumental in improving relations and at every level, 
economic, social and political.16 The INTERREG programme, loans from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and subsequently a series of EU framework programmes including 
the current Horizon 2020 improved joint management strategies and exponential 
infrastructural co-operation between state enterprises, agencies and local government on both 
sides of the border.17 As did changes in the European Commission’s criteria for awarding 
regional funding, with the border region designated as a single zone. The award of Objective 
One status and a key tool of the EU Cohesion Policy launched in 1998 (replaced in 2007 by 
the Convergence objective), was positive inducement to political authorities, public agencies 
and business stakeholders alike to respond to Brussels’ insistent call for and encouragement 
of institutional partnerships across what became an increasingly informal border. Not all has 
been plain sailing. Differences in administrative cultures between co-operating authorities 
both North and South has made for difficulties in the implementation and management of 
these ‘common’ programmes. The respective governments and no less so the European 
Commission have worked hard nevertheless to increase intergovernmental co-operation 
                                                          
13 J. Bradley, The Two Economies of Ireland: An Analysis’, in M. D’Arcy and T. Dickson (eds), Border 
Crossings: Developing Ireland’s Island Economy, (Gill and MacMillan, Dublin 1995), p.40. 
14 G. MacEnroe and W. Poole, Manufacturing: Two Plus Two Makes More than Four, in D’Arcy and Dickson 
(eds), ibid, (1995), p. 120.   
15 E. Tannam, Cross-Border Co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-
Functionalism Revisited’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6 (2), 2006, pp.256–276. 
16 Brennan, (1995), p. 75. 
17 M. Adshead and J. Tongue, Politics in Ireland: Convergence and Divergence on a Two Polity Island 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills 2009)  pp,220-22  
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essential for embedding the ‘peace process’ that eventually brought about an end to corrosive 
conflict by warring paramilitaries.18  
 
THE POST-1998 BORDER: FROM BARRIER TO CONDUIT  
The Irish Government’s decision, and a direct consequence of the peace process, to hold a 
referendum on rescinding the Republic’s claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was as 
much culturally symbolic as a political event. Emblematic because it was arranged 
concurrently with the plebiscite held in Northern Ireland that ratified the Belfast Agreement. 
The peace process marked the intensification of cross-border co-operation at every level. 
Moreover, it confirmed the integrative dynamic that has been the primary motor of the 
European project from its post-war origins. Cross-border transactions developed 
exponentially and on every level after 1998, from business and trade flows to functional and 
civic co-operation. Official figures cited in the House of Commons Report, Northern Ireland 
and the EU Referendum, confirm that by 2015 the Republic accounted for 61 percent of 
Northern Ireland’s exports to the EU, 34 percent of Northern Ireland’s total exports, and 
likewise for 49 percent of imports and 27 percent of total imports from the EU.19 Between the 
peace accord in1998 and 2015 intra-Irish trade almost doubled in value to some €2988.3m, 
and most notably in view of the Brexit conundrum with a differential value consistently 
favouring the trade flow from the North into the Republic.20  
Commerce is always a precursor of peaceful co-existence, Montesquieu amongst other 
commentators observing that, ‘‘trade is the single greatest alternative to war. The natural 
effect of commerce is to bring peace’’.21 Notwithstanding the Belfast Agreement was 
primarily about politics than trade, functional co-operation and most especially at ground 
level as myriad commercial transactions and other socio-economic activities grew apace:  
functional connections that have been key drivers of European integration, and confirmation 
here as elsewhere of the interdependency of politics, prosperity and peace. Nowhere more so 
than in the fractured society and contested cultural space that is Ireland. The peace process 
here is a mirror to an already tried and tested formula that is synergy between material 
progress, functional co-operation and transnational politics: those sequential developments 
                                                          
18 K. Bush and K. Houston, The story of peace, Learning from EU Peace Funding in Northern Ireland and the 
Border Region, International Conflict research Institute, especially at Part Two: Conditions for Peace in 
Northern Ireland, available online at 
https://www.seupb.eu/sites/default/files/styles/file_entity_browser_thumbnail/public/PEACE%20Content%20T
ype/9668%20-%20SEUPB%20The%20Story%20of%20Peace%20D9.pdf. 
19 Northern Ireland and the EU referendum: First Report of Session 2016-17, House of Commons, House of 
Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (May 2016), available online at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmniaf/48/48.pdf.   
20 InterTrade Ireland, Potential Impact of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade, 2017, available online at 
http://www.intertradeireland.com/media/InterTradeIrelandPotentialImpactofWTOTariff 
sResearcReportFINAL.pdf. 
21 Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (translated by A. Cohler et al, Cambridge University Press, 
1989 edition), p.338 
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that brought about and embedded the rules-based liberal international order that has reshaped 
European politics since 1945.22  
The peace process in Ireland is an exemplar then, indeed the culmination of that progressive 
outcome that brought closure to centuries of sectarian conflict. A process too that has 
combined moral imperative with political determination, effective leadership and novel 
institutional design. On the one hand, willingness on all sides and at every level between 
governments and communities, to think beyond the narrow constraints of cultural prejudice; 
and on the other hand, using political agency to deliver power sharing and ‘parity of esteem’, 
a necessary bridge to overcome centuries of mistrust and hostility. Novel arrangements that 
are both inter-communal (as between loyalists and nationalists) and intergovernmental 
(between the governments in London and Dublin), a symbiosis that would not have been 
realized or at least not so effective without considerable expenditure of material and political 
capital by Brussels.  
From the outset, the peace process was an international as much as merely an 
intergovernmental arrangement: underwritten both by Washington and Brussels and with 
direct involvement by the White House through the intermediation of Senator George 
Mitchell, appointed by President Clinton as Special Envoy of the President and Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland. These intermediaries were instrumental in the critical task of 
decommissioning paramilitary arms, a role undertaken by the Independent International 
Commission headed by Canadian General John de Chastelain. Moreover, the peace process 
acquired added legitimacy from its incorporation as an international treaty underwritten by 
the EU, which imposes strict and legally binding requirements on all parties. There was no 
instant transformation in relations between Northern Ireland’s historic communities. What 
these international interlocutors did help to achieve however was concrete action that both 
reinforced and legitimized communal co-operation on the ground. Cumulate progress that 
continued under international sponsorship, with material support and political encouragement 
from the governments in Dublin and London as principal co-guarantors of entirely novel 
political arrangements, and sustained by considerable material investment, and no less 
important political capital disbursed within a common EU policy framework: those outcomes 
that brought an unprecedented peace to this long-troubled island.  
The EU’s contribution to unique reconciliation by means of cross-border co-operation and 
wider regional integration is clear to see in the new institutional arrangements. Not only the 
North / South Ministerial Council that deals with matters of ‘high politics’, but the more 
direct impact at ground level of ‘implementation bodies’ for facilitating co-operation in 
matters of “mutual interest”. Principal agencies here are: Waterways Ireland, the Foyle, 
Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission, the Trade and Business Development Council, the 
Food Safety Promotion Board, the North / South Language Body consisting of two 
complementary agencies: Foras na Gaeilge and Tha Boord O Ulstèr-Scotch, and the Special 
European Union Programmes Body. These institutions and agencies contribute to closer all-
                                                          
22 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennin, The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process, in 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed), Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation  (Oxford University Press, New York 2004), 
pp.11-38. 
10 
 
Ireland / British Isles co-operation through regular meeting of ministers and officials, and 
they each have their legal base in the Belfast Agreement and the subsequent British Irish 
Agreement (1999) and enshrined in both domestic and international law. The Belfast 
Agreement extended the framework of Anglo-Irish and All-Ireland relations, mandating a 
new North / South Council for instance, to ‘‘consider the EU dimension of relevant matters, 
including the implementation of EU policies and programmes (with) arrangements to be 
made to ensure that the views of the [NSMC] are taken into account and represented 
appropriately at relevant EU meetings”.23 In the interests of communal and political balance, 
there was institutionalized reassurance for unionists in the form of a complementary British-
Irish Council that adds an East-West dimension to the North-South dimension. The remit of 
both Councils directly contributes to improved cross-border and UK / Irish co-operation in 
matters within the broader but complementary domains of European law and public policy. 
 
THE BREXIT CHALLENGE  
The historic achievement that is the Irish peace process is widely acknowledged and on every 
side of this ancient quarrel and beyond.  An editorial opinion in the influential Irish Times 
sees the Belfast Agreement and the peace process it initiated as something beyond merely 
realpolitik. As a process that, ‘‘binds Britain to something bigger than simply refereeing the 
Sharks and the Jets in the North (rather) it was the culmination of an approach to conflict 
resolution which deliberately, but subtly, smudged the boundaries of nation states. In that 
way it was European in nature (and) it created treaty obligations on both Britain and Ireland 
to uphold, for example, Northern Ireland’s have-cake-eat-cake citizenship rules and, most 
distressingly for harder Brexiteers, it codified areas of North-South co-operation that cannot 
plausibly continue with entirely alien economic and regulatory models on different parts of 
the island.’’24 Few commentators who have reviewed this outcome of an ancient quarrel 
would demur from this conclusion, or at least they would not have done so until Brexit, an 
event whose unanticipated consequences have put this remarkable achievement in jeopardy. 
Brexiteers are mostly dismissive of any such concerns. Motivated primarily with ‘taking back 
control’ of the British border they tend to see this historic enterprise in Ireland as merely a 
footnote to a troubled past, and by no means comparable to the ‘truly’ historic prize of 
recovering national sovereignty from Brussels.25  The border settlement in this narrative is 
expendable if need be, ‘mere’ collateral damage in pursuit of the ultimate prize of 
sovereignty redux. Not for these sovereigntists apprehension let alone moral angst over 
risking a still fragile peace: neither reservation about reinstating a hard border that might be 
incitement to returning violence, nor moral reservation about throwing history into reverse. 
                                                          
23 Belfast Agreement 1998, Strand Two, Paragraph 17, available online at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.pdf. 
24 Matthew O’Toole, Belfast Agreement constitutionally binds the UK to Europe, The Irish Times, December 18 
2017, available online at https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/belfast-agreement-constitutionally-binds-the-uk-
to-europe-1.3330384. 
25 This precisely the tone of the argument in Roger Scruton, England and the Need  for Nations, Civitas: 
Institute for the Study of Civil Society (London, 2004), especially at Chapters Nine and Ten,.  
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But Brexit has put this historic achievement at risk. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave 
the Customs Union and Single Market will require in some patent sense a border between the 
two ‘divorcing’ political jurisdictions and economic / legal orders in Ireland, where 
previously and in many key respects there was only one commercial and trade regime, albeit 
within two states. Although Brexit does not prohibit the North / South Ministerial Council 
from discussing issues that arise from EU law, rescinding the primacy and direct effect of EU 
law in effect does release the Northern Ireland authorities from that overarching legal order. 
A reversal whose principal effect will weaken the legal framework and loosen the rules that 
facilitate co-operation between the Republic and its agencies, and their counterparts in the 
North that are the Belfast Agreement’s juridical, political and administrative legacy. 
Moreover, the return of signage and the usual paraphernalia of an international border will 
impact negatively on the slow but sure peace process between formerly disconnected 
communities on either side of a reinstated border, but even more critically for durable peace 
between the politically long-divided and culturally separated  ‘tribes’ in Northern Ireland. 
Seen through the distortive prism of history, Brexit is then both provocation and existential 
threat to belated reconnection if not yet reconciliation between these communities. Moreover, 
it risks the tentative yet cumulate integration between two neighbouring states and much 
improved Anglo-Irish relations. This triptych of historic accommodations is precisely what is 
at stake here, jeopardising the fateful decision in1998 made possible by common EU 
Membership finally to answer the ‘Irish Question’. 
 
HISTORY REPEATS: BREXIT REVISITS AN AWKWARD PAST  
The events that have followed the historic Brexit vote are confirmation of incipient crisis in 
British politics, but no less so in Ireland.  Differences over issues of identity, nationhood and 
relations with the world beyond the Island have plagued the British Conservative Party over 
the course of its history. In the early nineteenth century, there was serious discord in Tory 
ranks over reforming the protectionist Corn Laws that almost destroyed the party as a force in 
national politics. A classic standoff between inward-looking and rent-seeking protectionism 
and out-reaching mercantilism whose main consequence was to put the Tories out of 
government for a generation and more.26 An ideological fall out revived later that same 
century in the squabble over imperial free trade and tariff reform, and one revisited 
throughout the late twentieth century and after as civil war over Britain’s place in the Europe 
Union.  
The ‘Europe’ issue in recent times has translated as an ideological schism between liberal 
internationalist ‘remainers’ in the party’s parliamentary ranks, and Eurosceptics viscerally 
opposed to the Maastricht Treaty and to every subsequent EU treaty. The latter faction 
gradually increased its influence in the parliamentary party and amongst rank-and-file 
members, and since the Brexit referendum has been active as the European Research Group, 
pushing its strident demand for a complete break with the EU, the hardest form of Brexit 
                                                          
26 Tim Bale, The Tory schism: from Robert Peel and the split over the Corn Laws to the Ukip insurgency, New 
Statesman (London), 4 September 2014, available online at 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/09/tory-schism-robert-peel-and-split-over-corn-laws-ukip-
insurgency. 
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come what may.27 The fall-out over Brexit and not least wrangling over the Irish border that 
is symptomatic of this ideological rift is merely the latest outbreak amongst mostly English 
Tories’ of its own ‘ancient quarrel over ‘Europe’.28    
Whatever the outcome of this fall-out for the status of the border in Ireland and indeed much 
else, avoidance of the United Kingdom crashing out of the EU will depend on what the 
respective parties to the withdrawal negotiations can come up with by way of a final 
agreement. Only a multi-level bargain between the principal parties that takes due account of 
the preferences and anxieties of both principal communities, and of stakeholders on either 
side of the border can avert full-blown crisis. As things currently stand, the prospects are 
hardly auspicious. The response of the British Government thus far, both with regard to the 
particularities of the border question or on the broader question of Britain’s future relations 
with the EU has been more dilatory than diligent. Avoidance of uncomfortable realities, 
procrastination in the face of difficult choices, preferring to defend what British negotiators 
call ‘red lines’, proposing bespoke ‘solutions’ that prioritise national interest rather than 
contributing to a balanced and judicious outcome is how most Brexit-watchers evaluate its 
performance so far. A workable solution to the conundrum that is the Irish border requires 
common sense and principled commitment: avoidance of a return to a ‘hard’ border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic that avoids compromising the political, constitutional and 
economic integrity of the United Kingdom as presently constituted. On the British side 
however, the priority has been to deliver the referendum mandate by recovering national 
jurisdiction over borders, money, free movement of people and autonomy in matters of trade.  
The default position here and frequently affirmed by British interlocutors is to propose some 
variant or other of the ‘cake and eat it’ preference that has defined the Government’s 
approach throughout the negotiations on withdrawal. The claim that there is no need to 
restore a physical border, that somehow smooth transit of goods and people, uninterrupted 
trade flows and avoidance of cumbersome regulatory mechanisms are all achievable 
objectives, if only Brussels will be flexible and compromise its rigid purposes. As Brexiteers 
see it, a feasible outcome by applying what are usually described as ‘common sense’ 
solutions, a compound of either ‘regulatory alignment’ or ‘equivalence’, together with use of 
smart technology. By such means they claim a manageable and frictionless border regime 
might be achieved and with minimal delays to cross-border commerce and without any 
detriment to the recovery of national autonomy.  
The catalogue of potential ‘solutions’ that combine customs arrangements with smart 
technology are reviewed in the third paper in this series, their difficulties identified although 
without dispelling doubts that such arrangements for what are glibly prescribed in some 
quarters as ‘simple’ solutions may in fact be rather more simplistic than straightforward. 
‘Experts’ so-called, a term that has lately acquired negative connotations in an age of 
‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake news’ remain mostly unconvinced about the feasibility of such 
‘obvious’ solutions to complicated issues, pointing out patent drawbacks. The promise of 
smart technology is a case in point, for even where there is political goodwill on both sides 
technology can only go so far towards ensuring frictionless borders, especially in this 
                                                          
27 Dan Sabbagh and Caelainn Barr, Jacob Rees-Mogg and the shadowy group of Tories shaping Brexit 
The Guardian (London), 6 February 2018, available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/06/jacob-rees-mogg-and-the-shadowy-group-of-tories-shaping-
brexit. 
28 Stephen Bates, Two Sides of the Same Party, History Today, Volume 63 Issue 3 March 2013. 
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politically problematic, historically contested region. Not least, where transit involves mixed 
cargoes, both of product type or where traded goods are subject to different technical 
standards and regulatory requirements or where post-Brexit tariff rates and amounts of duty 
applied are variable rather than uniform.  
For all of these reasons, the Irish border remains an unresolved question, an immanent 
challenge and for both sides in current negotiations. How then to ensure the easiest passage 
both ways over what is a long and geographically challenging border, some 500 kilometres in 
length and with over 250 crossing points? A difficult enough undertaking even in normal 
circumstances, but altogether more exacting for the management of a border resonant with 
political memory. There is more assurance on the British than the Irish side that the border 
conundrum is solvable, but then again unalloyed optimism has been the United Kingdom’s 
default position throughout these negotiations, but so far without finding any satisfactory 
answer to this latest version of an enduring ‘Irish’ question.  
The EU for its part has to date been altogether more circumspect in its responses to British 
proposals. The response of the EU’s principal negotiator to United Kingdom proposals for the 
Irish border published in August 2017 was hardly encouraging, asserting that, “what we see 
in the UK paper is a lot of magical thinking about how an invisible border would work in the 
future….. if you look at the Irish paper, it is very good on aspirations but it is short on 
workable solutions.”29 There is unease then in Brussels that the United Kingdom is treating 
the border more as political hostage than a merely functional issue to be resolved, using the 
issue as convenient leverage to gain concessions on its future trade relations with EU27. 
What will be the fate of the latest United Kingdom proposal, the so-called Chequers deal for 
a ‘facilitated customs arrangement’ and the proposal for a ‘common rule book’ to ensure 
frictionless trade, and whether this will resolve the border imbroglio remains to be seen. The 
indications thus far are less than reassuring. Officials in Brussels tend to view British 
responses to the border question, indeed to Brexit per se through the distortive lens of an 
assumed British exceptionalism. To see this latest plan as they saw its predecessors, 
principally as a bargaining counter for securing selfish ends: the intention above all else to 
free ride, to subvert the rules and logics of the Single Market and Customs Union for narrow 
national advantage. Yet more cherry picking, another attempt to undermine the “indivisibility 
of the single market, a position the European Commission…want to defend — even if the 
price is a no-deal Brexit.’’30 These perceptions, or misconceptions depending on the preferred 
narrative, are critical to what is at stake between these quite different, indeed countervailing 
outlooks on the daunting challenge facing the parties to the current negotiations. Whether the 
outcome of the border conundrum is final answer to the seemingly endless Irish question 
remains to be seen.  
 
 
                                                          
29 Jennifer Rankin, UK accused of ‘magical thinking’ over Brexit plan for Irish border, The Guardian (London), 
available online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/25/uk-accused-of-magical-thinking-over-
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